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I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is reported that Lenin once said: "The road to Paris and London leads through
Bombay and Calcutta."' This statement clearly indicates the importance which
Marxism-Leninism has attached from the very beginning to the political and socio-
economic problems of the former colonial and less developed countries in the world.
In exposing the doctrine of the historical inevitability of socialism, Lenin believed
that the underdeveloped and colonial countries of the world, in given conditions and
with the support of Socialist states, will be able to bypass the capitalist stage of the
historical economic development and launch directly upon the building of socialism?
However, in the early stage of the Bolshevik regime, as a practical foreign policy
towards the underdeveloped areas, Leninism envisaged that the colonial and semi-
colonial states would attain their "ultimate and complete freedom" in two stages:
(I) the national and political liberation of the country from its colonial status; and
(2) the political and socioeconomic liberation of the country from its domestic
exploiters3
For the realization of the first stage, Lenin and later Stalin advocated collaboration
of indigenous communist movements with nationalist and bourgeois elements-
provided, however, that the forces and the organization of the local communists were
kept as separate political entities and that they remained all times independent in
their political decisions! Once the first stage of the liberation is achieved, Leninism
OLL.B. 1931, J.S.D. 1932, University of Zagreb (Yugoslavia); Ph.D. i95o, Georgetown University;
M.Comp.L. 1954, George Washington University. Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. Member of the bars of the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Author, INDUSTRIALIzATIoN OF PEASANT EUROPE (1954). Contributor to the Encyclopedia Americana and
to legal and economic periodicals in the United States, Europe, and South America.
'A. Z. RUBNs'rEIN (ED.), THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIE UNION 341 (i96o) [hereinafter cited
as RUBINSrEIN].
2 Herman, The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid, in" DIMsENSIONS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC Powas 478
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Herman].
' These two stages are expounded in Lenin's theory of imperialism, Stalin's views on the solution
of national and colonial questions, and the Program of the Communist International of 1928. Cf.
RUBINsTEIN 341-72. This policy is applied also today, openly by the Chinese communists, especially in
Africa, and more subtly by the Soviets in the formerly colonial areas of the world. Cf. Cooley, China's
Push in Africa, 79 CoiMMoNVEwAL 424 (1964); also Paasche, Sowietische Konzeptionen fuer Unabhaengigge-
wordene Entwicklungslaender [Soviet Views Concerning the Newly Created Underdeveloped Independent
States], 14 OsrEUROPA 409 (1964).
ILenin's and Stalin's theses on the position and strategy of the communist forces in colonial states
and underdeveloped areas are explained in several of their works, articles, and speeches. See XENIA
JOtrnOFF EUDIN & ROBERT C. NORTH, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE EAST, 1920-1927, at 45-71 (1957).
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teaches, the local Communist Party, supported by the international proletarian
movement, must wage the battle for the attainment of the second stage, the establish-
ment of the Socialist state.' Thus, in pursuing its eventual goal in colonial countries
and underdeveloped areas, Leninism has always recognized the necessity of temporary
compromises with the nationalist and bourgeois forces if, in final analysis, such
compromise furthered the accomplishment of the ultimate aim, the World Socialist
revoludon.6
Although the ideas of Lenin and Stalin concerning Bolshevik policy and tactics
towards colonial and semi-colonial states in the early period of the Soviet regime were
primarily of a political nature, Lenin pointed out as early as i92o that on the path
to their ultimate political and economic freedom these countries "must maintain also
a close economic alliance with the Soviet Republic."7
Naturally, in the early ig2os the Soviet Union was not strong enough to under-
take any sizable economic steps which would support its political and ideological
offensive beyond its borders.S The Soviets' primary concern was to consolidate
their internal political stability and to build up their own independent economy. The
latter was accomplished with the great help of the Western Powers, notably by
the private economic concerns of the United States, during the period of the
New Economic Policy. At the same time the Soviet Union began to penetrate
into the sphere of international economic relations by concluding its first trade agree-
ment with the United Kingdom on March i6, i921.10
Subsequently, in the period between the two world wars, the Soviets have signed
a large number of international trade agreements, but only a few of these could be
regarded as treaties offering foreign aid in form of credits or direct grants. The latter
This doctrine, in its essence, has not been changed until today in spite of the more flexible tactics
adopted by the Soviet government. See Editorial, Marksistichko-leninsaia teoria revolucii i rovremenoe
istoricheskoe razvitie [Marx-Lenin Theory of Revolution and the Contemporary Historical Development],
5 VoPsosi FssosoFn 3 (1958); also, JOHN M. MACINTOSH, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Os SOVIET FoRIGN
POLICY 51-58 (1963).
6A typical example of the communist and other leftist collaboration with the bourgeols-nationalist
elements in the two stages of national liberation and social revolution is offered in Algeria. In the
first stage-the struggle for the national and political liberation of the country-the communists co-
operated fully with the bourgeois-nationalist strata of the population and their leaders. In the second
stage-the building up of a socialist Algeria-the moderate and nationalist elements have been completely
eliminated and, where necessary, suppressd. The second example, more familiar to American observers,
is Cuba. Cf. RoGER HILssAN, THE SINo-SoviET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE THROUOH JUNE 30, 1962, at 6-7
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Hn.smat].
7 RUBINSTEIN 359.
8At one moment during the Civil War, the Soviet economy was nearing total collapse. Only ten
per cent of Russia's former coal supply, less than twenty-five per cent of iron foundries, and less than
one half of the grain-producing areas were under the control of the Soviet government. Cf. MAURICE
DOB, SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1917, at 98 (1948).
'Id. at 125-207; also, WERNER KELLER, OsT MINUS WEsT---NULL, DER AUFBAU RUSSLANDS DUIICH
DEN Wr rEN, 226-277 (196o).
oJAN F. TRISKA & ROBERT M. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES 294-95
(1962). It is of interest to note that this treaty, though commercial in character, contained also purely
political clauses, such as the prohibition of hostile activity and propaganda on the territory of the
other party, non-interference in domestic matters, and so on.
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was true especially in the Middle East to which the Soviet economic penetration was
directed in the late twenties and early thirties. Thus, as a predecessor of the present
Soviet foreign aid, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of May 8, 1932 should be mentioned."
According to this treaty, the Soviet Union gave a credit to Turkey in the amount
of eight million dollars for the purchase of industrial and agricultural machinery.
In addition, the Soviet Union made a present to Turkey consisting of ten tractors,
five tanks, two trucks, and one bus. The credit loan was made without interest and
was repayable over a period of twenty years in Turkish produce. The eight million
credit was later used by Turkey for the purchase of textile machinery from the Soviet
Union. 2
In World War II, the Soviet economy suffered severe blows, but its recovery was
rather swift and efficient.13 The emergence of a number of Socialist states in Eastern
Europe and in Asia between 1945 and 1948 demanded from the Soviet regime for the
first time a close economic cooperation with these countries in assisting their political
and economic consolidation. Thus a series of agreements offering credits and tech-
nical assistance, or cancelling debts of individual Socialist countries, was concluded
between the Soviet Union and the newly created socialist states in the period from
1945 to 1953, totalling transactions in the amount of approximately 2.5 billion dollars,
which amount increased to 6.5 billion dollars by the end of I962.'
In the same period, certain colonial countries in Asia, notably Burma, Ceylon,
India, and Indonesia became independent states. However, their independence was
not the result of political or revolutionary action of the local communist forces
but the consequence of the changed political conditions in those parts of the world.
As a rule, it was the outcome of peaceful compromises reached between the former
colonial powers and the nationalist movements. For this reason, the early Soviet
attitude towards the newly established regimes in South-East Asia was not favorable.
Stalin, following rigidly the established Leninist doctrine of liberation of colonial
states, considered these regimes as puppet governments controlled by their former
colonial masters, and was therefore unwilling to support them politically or assist
them economically.'
In 1949, when the United Nations debated the mode and the volume of the
economic aid to be given to the underdeveloped areas of the world, the Soviet Union
at first reacted favorably and advocated that such assistance be given through the
United Nations.' Later, the Soviets changed their mind and refused to contribute
anything for this purpose because Stalin was, in principle, still opposed to economic
"VIOLET CONOLLY, SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE EAST 49 (1933)-
I21d. at 49-50.
11 DoB, op. cit. supra note 8 at 29o-3i2.
1
'Carnctt & Crawford, The Scope and Distribution ol Soviet Economic Aid, in DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET
ECoNoMIC POWER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 474 [hereinafter cited as Carnett & Crawford]; see also JOSEPH
S. BERLINER, SOVIET EcoNoMIC AID 52-53 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BERLINER].
"RUIBINSTEIN 389-94; see also BERLINER 13-14.
" BERLINER 15.
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aid to any country which was not communist dominated, or in which, in his opinion,
the conditions were not ripe for a communist take-over.j 7
One of the factors which contributed to the eventual change of the Soviet view
was the communist seizure of power in China. The Chinese communists adopted
from the very beginning of their rule a more flexible approach to the problems of
foreign economic aid and cooperation with the neighboring Asiatic countries. Yet,
the official Soviet attitude could not be changed until after Stalin's death.'
Stalin died in March 1953; and the disposition of his successors towards the policy
and problems of foreign aid to non-socialist countries became immediately much
more flexible and pragmatic. As early as August 1953, the first foreign aid agreement
was concluded between the Soviet Union and Argentina, by which the former gave
credit of 30 million dollars for the purchase of oil drilling equipment.'" This agree-
ment was followed by substantial credit allowances of Afghanistan in 1954, and then to
India and Burma in I955.20 The formal turning point in the policy of the Soviet
economic offensive was marked by the speech of Chairman Khrushchev, delivered at
the 2oth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February x4, x956.
Discussing the new aspect of the Soviet foreign economic policy towards the former
colonial countries and underdeveloped areas of the world in general, Khrushchev
said:
These countries, although they do not belong to the socialist world system, can draw on
its achievements to build up an independent national economy and to raise living standards
of their people. Today, they need not go begging for modern equipment to their former
oppressors. They can get it in the socialist countries without assuming any political or
military commitments.21
Khrushchev elaborated further the objectives of the Soviet economic offensive in
his speech of January 27, 1959, in which he said:
Our country builds its relations with all states on principles of complete equality and
collaboration without any conditions of military or political nature. Of course, we are
not engaged in charity. Soviet Union gives aid on fair commercial principles. Socialist
countries help the undeveloped nations to create their own industry, while the United
States seeks to sell to them consumer goods which have no sale on other markets.22
II
MoTIvEs AND OBJECTIVES
Soviet authors and statesmen describe their motives and objectives in providing
economic aid to underdeveloped countries as most noble and unselfish. Socialist
economic assistance, they assert, facilitates the advance of these nations on the road
""RUBINSTEIN 393-94-
8 HIL MAN 2-4; BERLINER 14. For Stalin's ideas on the structure of the socialist economy and its
goals, see JosEPH STALN, Las PROBLiMES IECONOMIQUES DU SOCIALISME EN U.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1952).
"' BERLINER I98.
"0 id. at 198-99.
2 RUBINSrEIN 395.
22 id. at 401-02
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to progress. "We were taught this by the great Lenin," says Mikoyan, and addsi
"This is an example of proletarian internationalism in action under modern condi-
tions.23
The truth, we submit, is different, and the Soviet motives and objectives are not
so benevolent as official Soviet statements suggest.24
It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that the foreign economic policy of
every Socialist country controlled by the communists is an integral part of foreign
relations in a broader sense.25 It is therefore rigidly controlled by the respective
communist governments, and adapted to the needs and objectives of communist
world strategy. As Khrushchev said bluntly on one occasion: "We value trade least
for economic reasons and most for political reasons."26  Consequently, any foreign
aid which the Soviet Union or other Socialist states are extending to former colonial
and underdeveloped nations is devised to be one of the instruments through which
the final goal of Marxism-Leninism-the world revolution-is to be achieved7
The immediate objectives of the communist economic offensive are, of course,
more limited. They are designed
(a) to neutralize the recipient country politically and economically;
(b) to achieve a gradual pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese inclination of the recipient;
(c) to increase the political and economic prestige of the socialist camp among the
underdeveloped nations;
(d) to infiltrate the countries which receive foreign aid politically, economically
and culturally;
(e) to bolster the global military posture of the communist orbit (in cases where
military assistance is offered to individual underdeveloped states).28
In the countries which are already dominated by the communist regimes, which is
the case in Albania, Yugoslavia or Cuba, the principal purpose of foreign aid is the
political strengthening and economic consolidation of that regime.29
Political and economic neutralization of an underdeveloped country is of special
importance where the recipient has had in the past a close and long relationship with
2 Pravda, Moscow, Oct. 22, i96, p. I. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), in October x961, Anastas Mikoyan pointed out that the world-wide economic
offensive of the Soviet Union and other socialist states is an example of the just methods of maintaining
economic ties off the basis of equality and of the noble intentions of facilitating the advance of these
peoples on the road to progress. Pravda, Moscow, Oct. 22, ig6r, p. I; see also Fedorenko, The Soviet
Union and Airican Countries, The Annals, July 1964, pp. i-8.
2' The true motives of the Soviets in offering economic and military aid to underdeveloped nations
are questioned not only by the free world but also by Communist China. The latter has openly
warned the former colonial countries and less developed nations that they will be eventually subject to
Soviet domination if they accept aid from Moscow. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1954, p. I, col. 6.
" BERLINER 8; Fieri, Foreign Trade, in INFORMATION U.S.S.R. 359 (1962). Harmstone, Foreign
Trade and Aid, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RussiA AND TaH SOVIET UNION 177-82 (ig6i).
16 RUBINSrEN 383.
'7 Herman 477-79; see also BER.LINER 21-26.
28 Carnctt & Crawford 461-462; BERLINER 17-29.
9 RUBINSTrEIN 375 if.
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the West. This pattern is demonstrated by the Soviet economic offensive in India,
Ceylon, and Burma, in the countries of the Middle East, and also in the African states
that were formerly part of the British or French colonial empires."0 Political neu-
tralization-which is also promoted by Yugoslavia in her economic policy towards
the so-called non-aligned nations31-is aimed at the destruction or weakening of the
existing defense agreements or military alliances which these countries may have
with the Western powers.
The political and economic prestige of the socialist camp is expected to be increased
by stressing the friendly character of the economic help extended by the Soviet
Union or other socialist donor-assertedly given as a part of the policy of peaceful
coexistence, without any conditions of a political or military nature8 2 At the same
time, accusations are levelled at the capitalist countries, in particular at the United
States, which, the communists say, offer foreign help for their selfish purposes and
whose aid is but another form of economic colonial exploitation83
Political, cultural, and economic infiltration is achieved by sending to the recipient
country, pursuant to the aid agreement or mutual cooperation agreement, a large
number of technical experts, military advisers, and cultural workers. These indi-
viduals, in most cases, in addition to their professional skills and backgrounds, are
also politically trained to extoll the successes of the Soviet Union and of other
socialist countries, and are instructed to publicize the advantages of socialism 8 4
III
FORMS AND CONDITIONS
Soviet bloc foreign aid is given by bilateral international agreements between
the donor and the recipient, and is expressed in four different forms:
(a) by the opening of credit or giving loan in a specified amount for a project or
group of projects;
(b) by a straight grant for a designated purpose;
(c) by military assistance supplying the recipient with arms and ammunition;
(d) by a mutual cooperation agreement?-'
The most common form of economic aid is extension of credit. This form of aid
is preferred by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, except China, for two
MAcINTosn, op. cit. supra note 5, at 135-40.
Il Cf. PRESIDENT Trro's MEETINGS wrrH STATESMEN OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES 30-44 (Belgrade,
196); see also KENNETH R. WMTING, THE SoVIET UNIoN TODAY 334-40 (1962).
" Carnett & Crawford 465.
5 5 Khrushchev, in his speech of Jan. 27, 1959, as reported in RUBINSTEIN 395
" BERLINR 26-29; A. Rankovic, the Yugoslav Vice-President, commented on the position of these
technical experts and cultural workers with the following words: "They are ambassadors of our develop-
ment and of our concepts, and of our desire to help friends whose difficulties we can easily understand
as our own difficulties were similar." THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA TO
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 69 (Belgrade, 1963).
iHLSMAN 12-16; Carnett & Crawford 462-65; Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Assistance to Less De-
veloped Countries, State Department Memorandum, February x963, pp. 3-6 (Unpublished) [hereinafter
cited as Memorandum].
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principal reasons. First, credit extension gives the impression of a fair commercial
deal to which no political or military conditions are attached. Secondly, credit agree-
ments, the execution of which is extended over a longer period of time, serve at the
same time as a control of and as a brake on the recipient country3 6
The credit is given, as a rule, for a specific project or a number of projects to be
undertaken in the recipient country, and can be drawn upon during a number of
years, depending upon the anticipated length of construction, usually up to seven
years. The projects for which the credits are extended vary, but industrialization
and mining account for almost seventy per cent of all the credit arrangements
7
This trend is fully in line with Lenin's theory that the creation of an industrial
proletariat is necessary for the strengthening of revolutionary forces in the country
predestined to play the decisive role in the anticipated socialist revolution3 Credits
are also given for amelioration works in agriculture. These constitute about twelve
per cent of the total credits extended. The rest, about thirteen per cent, is given
for transport facilities, road building, and other minor projects39
Credits are never given to private entrepreneurs or corporations, but always
to the public sector of national economy of the recipient state. Thus, the eventual
nationalization of the economic system as a whole is being facilitated4
Every credit agreement is usually divided into two parts: the general conditions
under which the credit is extended (i.e., its amount, interest, and repayment), and
the mode of its utilization. The latter stipulates specific conditions, such as the
contribution to be given by the recipient for the realization of the project, the terms
of utilization of the credit (which are usually subject to the completion of the
individual stages of the project), arrangements for the exchange of a number of
individuals from the recipient country who will be trained for the work on the
project, and so on.4 ' The second part of the credit extension agreement covers also
the number of the expert technicians to be supplied by the creditor, as well as their
salaries and conditions of employment.
It is believed that by the end of 1962, about twenty-seven per cent of all economic
credits extended by the socialist countries have actually been utilized. In military
assistance, the utilization has been much larger and amounts to eighty-five per cent.-
The money value of new economic credits has been temporarily in decline from
i961 to 1963. In i96o, the extended economic credits reached their peak at 1-176 billion
dollars. In 1962, they have declined for more than fifty per cent, to 519 million dollars.
The utilization of the credits extended was largest in 1962, when it amounted to 395
so HirsmAN 12-13; Carnctt & Crawford 462.
07 Herman 481.
s BERLINER 25; EurN & NoRTH, Op. dt. supra note 4, at 68-70.
' HILSMAN x2; Herman 481.
"Herman 482.
" HISMAN zz; Carnett & Crawford 464.
12 HILIMAN 12; Memorandum 7- It appears that the utilization of the new and previously extended
credits was the highest in 1963, though the exact figures have not beeff disclosed so far.
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million dollars 3 However, since the beginning of 1963, the foreign economic aid
of the Soviet Union and all other communist controlled states has again been on the
increase. One of the reasons for this trend is the rivalry for prestige and leadership
between the Soviet Union and Communist China in Asia and in Africa. Within
the last year, since the Fall of 1963, the Soviet Union alone has extended over 80o
million dollars in new credits to various underdeveloped states 4
The extension of credit for a specific project is regularly contingent upon the
contributions to be made by the recipient to the common venture. These contribu-
tions usually comprise the supply of the local building material and non-qualified
labor.
The interest rate on credit, is usually 2-2.5 per cent, 5 though the Chinese have
given large credits, as for instance to Burma in 1961 in the amount of 84 million
dollars, without any interest.46 Interest rates of the satellite countries are often
higher, and amount to four or five per cent.47 Yugoslavia's interest rate is usually
three per cent.
Approximately seventy-five per cent of all the credits granted by the Soviet Bloc
are to be repaid in twelve annual installments beginning with the year after the
project is completed. In some instances, the period of repayment is much longer
and may be extended over fifty years with deferred payments up to twenty-five
years. A small portion of the credits granted by the Satellites (twelve per cent) is
shorter in duration and repayable within a period of five to nine years after the
completion of the project s
Repayment is stipulated either in gold or in hard currency (United States dollars
or British pounds sterling), or by the export of raw materials and goods from the
recipient country to the creditor at the regular world prices prevailing at the time
when the installments are due 9 It is for this reason that Soviet economists some-
times tend to interpret regular commercial agreements which provide for the ex-
change of machinery and technical equipment with raw materials and foodstuffs
also as foreign economic aid. 0
Direct grants are given mainly by China, and have totalled approximately 120
million dollars. They were granted to Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, Egypt, Yemen,
Guinea, and Zanzibar. 1 The Soviet Union occasionally also gives direct grants for
"'Memorandum i.
"The principal recipients were in Africa and in the Middle East, Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Somalia,
and Zanzibar, and in Asia, India, Afghanistan and Iran. Cf. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1964, p. 5, coL. I,
China's new credits within the last year amounted to approximately 150 million dollars.
5 HijLsAN 13; Carnett & Crawford 463.
"'Very recently, Red China has extended interest free loans to Zanzibar (14 million dollars), to
Somalia (2o million), and to Pakistan (6o million). Cf. The Washington Post, June 9, 1964, pp. A 1s,
B 27; N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 5964, p. I, col. 4.
41 HILSMAN 53; Memorandum 6.
"'HILsMAN 13-14; Carnett & Crawford 463.
"Memorandum 6.
o BER.INER 5.
5 Memorandum 6; N.Y. Times, June 21, x964, p. 13, co. I.
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specific purposes; for instance, 8o million dollars to Afghanistan in 1959, and also
minor grants to other countries in Asia, notably to Nepal, Burma, and Indonesia. 2
The total value of military assistance offered by the Soviet-Sino Bloc until the
middle of 1962 was over 2.5 billion dollars. 3 Since then, this type of foreign aid has
increased considerably, especially to Cuba and to some other countries in Asia and
in Africa, such as Indonesia, Somalia, Ghana, Algeria, and Zanzibar. 4 In giving
military assistance, the political and strategic motives of the donor have been of
primary consideration, and no requirements have been made that the arms delivered
must be used for defense purposes only.55 The deliveries of the military material
include all types of arms and ammunition, such as small arms, artillery, tanks,
aircraft, submarines and other small boats, and in some instances even rockets 6
The main recipients of the Sino-Soviet Bloc military aid were, in Asia, Indonesia
and Afghanistan; in the Middle East, Syria, Iraq and Egypt; and in Africa, Somalia,
Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Algeria and Zanzibar. Yugoslavia has also offered military
assistance to a number of underdeveloped countries, notably to Indonesia and Algeria.
A special form of foreign aid, which is usually but not necessarily contingent upon
the utilization of a credit, is technical assistance. This type of aid is sometimes stipu-
lated in the mutual cooperation agreements concluded between individual socialist
states and underdeveloped countries.Y7 Technical and cultural assistance is extended
in two ways: either the donor assumes the obligation to provide a number of tech-
nical experts or cultural workers to supervise the anticipated project and to train
and educate local personnel, or the recipient sends to the donor's country a number
of individuals for training and education. Of course, both alternatives can be
carried out simultaneously.
It is believed that approximately 13,500 economic and technical experts and
cultural workers from various Socialist countries are currently working in 30 under-
developed countries on four continents.5" In addition, about 8,50o military technicians
are employed as instructors in the countries which receive military aid from the
Soviet Union and other Socialist states. The greatest number of "military instructors"
are presently in Cuba (over 6,ooo); and the rest are employed in the Middle East
(about 1,3oo), and i,2oo in Africa and Asia.5
' HILMAN 24-28; Carnett & Crawford 467-69.
HILSMAN I4-I5
.
"The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., Feb. 3, 1964, p. A 5; The Washington Daily News, Feb. 4.
1964, P. 7; The Washington Post, June 9, 1964, p.:B 27; N.Y. Times, May 7, 1964, PP. I and 6.
" HILSMAN 15; BERLINER 48-5 o .
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1964, p. 2, col. 6.
"HILsMAN 15-16; Carnett & Crawford 464-65.:
"' Memorandum 3.
"Id. at 3. The total number of the so-called military technicians of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in various
underdeveloped countries has never been officially revealed. Of course, the concept and definition of a
"military technician or instructor" varies and often it is impossible to distinguish between the genuine
military technicians and the combat ready military units.
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IV
VOLUME AND BENEFiciAmES
The total economic foreign aid of all socialist states to underdeveloped nations,
from 1954 until the middle of 1964, has been approximately 6.6 billion dollars.
To this amount 2.5 billion dollars in military assistance should be added. Hence, the
total amount of all foreign aid, economic and military, extended in that period,
amounted to 9.x billion dollars.60 The distribution of economic aid by individual
Socialist countries is as follows: the Soviet Union, 4.4 billion; European Satellites,
i. billion; China, 700 million; and Yugoslavia, 30o million.
In the period from 1954 to 196o, when the amount of foreign economic aid was
on a permanent increase, the aid was given at an average rate of 700 million dollars
yearly. Since I96O, the amount of the economic aid offered by the European Satellites
has also been increasing; and in 1962 these countries contributed almost as much in
new credits as the Soviet Union."' There is no distinguishable pattern of the division
of geographical areas, or of types of projects, of credit extensions by the Soviet Union
and the Satellites. However, the steadily increasing larger participation of the
European Socialist countries, outside the Soviet Union, indicates their capability of
independent economic action in the communist economic offensive0 2
Areas, individual underdeveloped countries, and amounts of foreign aid extended
by the Socialist states are shown in the following table:
TABLE z03
SING-SoviET BLoc EcONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED To LEsS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
January 1, 1954-July 3r, 1964
(Million U.S. dollars)
Area and Country Total Economic Credits and Grants
Total
Asia 2.722
Afghanistan ................................ 574
Burma .................................... 97
Cambodia .................................. 65
Ceylon .................................... 69
India ...................................... 1.182
Indonesia .................................. 638
Nepal ..................................... 54
Pakistan ................................... 93
Middle East 1 .95
Cyprus .................................... 1
Iran ....................................... 46
Iraq ....................................... 218
Syria ...................................... 193
Turkey .................................... 17
Egypt ..................................... 996
Yemen .................................... 24
" These figures are approximate only and have been determined according to the data published so
far. The increased amounts of military assistance by the communist orbit since July x962, which are
known but were not published, are not included in these figures.
"
1Memorandum 3.
02 Ibid.
" This table has been compiled on the basis of table 4 of the Memorandum, at p. 8, and has been
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TABLE i Cont.
Area and Country Total Economic Credits and Grants
Africa 1.028
Algeria .................................... 236
Ethiopia ................................... 114
Ghana .................................... 246
Guinea .................................... 125
M ali ...................................... 98
M orocco ................................... 17
Somalia .................................... 98
Sudan ..................................... 23
Tunisia .................................... 46
Zanzibar ................................... 25
Latin America 849
Argentina .................................. 104
Bolivia .................................... 2
Brazil ..................................... 74
Cuba ...................................... 669
Europe 166
Iceland .................................... 5
Yugoslavia ................................. 151
Yugoslavia to underdeveloped countries
(see Table 2) ............................. 800
Grand Total 6.600
There is no indication of geographical preference of individual Socialist countries
in the extention of credits, except that China has demonstrated specific interest for
South East Asia, Albania, and more recently also for Africa.64 The credit agreements
of the Soviet Union and the satellite states, as well as their military assistance, are
spread over four continents, and it is clear that the industrially more advanced
Satellites, i.e., Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, participate in eco-
nomic aid with a larger share than the others. 5 Albania is the sole Socialist country
which has received only foreign economic and military aid, while Yugoslavia, on the
other hand, is the only Socialist state which receives foreign aid and also extends it
on its own account to underdeveloped nations.
Scrutinizing the geographic areas to which economic aid is extended, and in-
dividual countries, we see that in Asia the most important recipient is India, with
supplemented by the recent available data published in the daily press until Aug. 1, 1964. All figures
are approximate. The aid of China to Albania, in the amount of 124 million dollars, is not shown in
this table.
" Since the rivalry for leadership between the Soviet Union and Red China has been intensified, the
Chinese Communists have directed their efforts of political and economic penetration, in particular, to
Africa. On this continent, they hope to achieve great successes by giving grants and offering interest-
free loans to newly created states. There is no doubt that the Chinese are skillfully using their racial
advantages, pointing out that the Western Powers, as well as the Soviet Union and the European
Socialist states, are all dominated by the white man who, as an image, still represents to a great number
of Africans the symbol of colonialism and political and economic oppression. Cf. Harry Schwartz, "Chou
Bid in Africa," N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1964, p. 6, col. z; also Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1964, p. I and
A 9; also FitzGerald, The Sino-Soviet Balance Sheet in the Underdeveloped Areas, The Annals, Jan.
1964, pp. 40-49.
"l Carnett & Crawford 467-73; Memorandum 8-25.
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well over one billion dollars in granted credits offered mostly by the Soviet Union.0 0
In assistance to India Czechoslovakia participates with fifty million, Poland with
thirty-two million, and Yugoslavia with forty million dollars. 7  In credit arrange-
ments offered to Indonesia, in addition to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and China also participate0
In Burma, Cambodia, Nepal and Laos, the main creditor is China, while in
Ceylon, China and the Soviet Union participate almost with equal shares.
0 9
In Egypt, the principal creditor is the Soviet Union with 813 million dollars, but
the amounts of the credits extended by the European Satellites are also considerable.
Czechoslovakia has given credits loans to Egypt in total sum of ioi million dollars;
East Germany, thirty-six million; Poland, twenty million; and Hungary, twenty-
three million.7
0
Syria has received economic aid from all Soviet Bloc countries, including Bulgaria.
This is the case also in Ghana and Guinea where the total Satellite credits amount to
eighty million dollars.
71
In Cuba, at the end of 1962, the distribution of the credits extended by the Sino-
Soviet Bloc was as follows: the Soviet Union, 312 million dollars, Satellites ninety-
seven million, and China sixty million7
The People's Republic of China is at the present moment the only Socialist
country which has given credits to Albania.73 Chinese credits to that country amount
to 112 million rubles (i25 million dollars), and were given by an agreement of
February 2, 196T. There are approximately 8oo Chinese technicians working in
Albania on various industrial projects and military installations. The Chinese-
Albanian agreement also established a joint Albanian-Chinese Shipping Company.7 '
Recently, China has concentrated her political and economic efforts on penetrating
the new independent states of Africa and enlarging her economic and political in-
fluence among her neighbors in Asia.75
60 The larger part of the credits extended to India by the Soviet Union was uscd for the construction
of the Bhilai Steel Mill. The new Soviet credits granted in x964 will be used for the erection of the
Bokaro Steel Mill, now under construction. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1964, p. 5, col. I.67 Memorandum 9; Dorothea Kiefer, Jugoslawien [Yugoslavia], in SlIDOsTEUROPA UND DiE ENrwiCK-
LUNGSLAENDER [SOUTHEAST EUROPE AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES] 29 (Siidost-Institut Mainchen
1963) [hereinafter cited as SiDOnrrSuROPA].
" Memorandum 10; Sr3DOSuROPA 31.
69 Memorandum io.
7o Memorandum 11; SVJDOSTEuRoPA 81-84.
"
1Memorandum ii; SinosrURoPA 87-88, i15-ii6, 133.
"Memorandm 21. The credits to Cuba from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, in the last 18 months, have
increased for approximately 150 million dollars, military assistance not included.
"
5From 1945 to 5959, Albania had also received substantial credits from the Soviet Union and other
Socialist countries, including Yugoslavia until 195o. All these credits amounted to 63o million dollars.
Carnett & Crawford 474.
7' COMMUNIST CHINA YEARaooK, 1962, at 505 (Hong-Kong, x963).
" On July 31, x964, the government of Pakistan announced that China has granted to it a long term
interest free loan of sixty million dollars to be used for the purchase of machinery, cement, and sugar
mills. N.Y. Times, Aug. s, x964, p. 1, col. 4. In' Africa, China has recently granted substantial
interest free loans, or given direct grants to Ghana, Somalia, Algeria, and Zanzibar. The Evening Star,
(Washington, D.C.), Feb. 3, x964, p. A 5, col. 6; The Washington Post, June 9, 1964, p. A ax and B. a7.
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V
YUGOSLAVIA'S PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN AID
The position of Yugoslavia in the extension of foreign aid to underdeveloped
countries should be examined separately. Though not formally a political, military, or
economic member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Yugoslavia is nevertheless a Socialist
country ruled by communist dictatorship. As such, Yugoslavia is an important
member of the communist orbit to which she is bound by strong and close ideological
ties and common political interest. Due to her special position in international rela-
tions during the last fifteen years, Yugoslavia has been the only country in the
communist world which has been receiving economic assistance from the West and
from the East. Moreover, this two-sided help has enabled her, in spite of serious
domestic economic difficulties, to offer economic and military assistance, on her own
behalf and in her own name, to many less developed countries all over the globe. The
basic motive of the Yugoslav economic offensive has been the desire to prove the
political and economic advantages of an "independent socialist state" and thus to pro-
mote the ideas of socialism and neutrality among the former colonial and under-
developed nations.7" This does not mean that Yugoslav aims in extending foreign
economic aid have been, in essence, different from those of the Soviet Union, China,
or any other Socialist state. President Tito himself has pointed out that Yugoslavia
must offer such help not only in her own interest but also in the interest of socialism
in general, in cooperation with the Soviet Union and in the spirit of socialist inter-
nationalism7
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Yugoslav foreign economic aid is
given also to promote the development of her domestic economy which is now
seeking new markets for its growing industrial production.78
The two usual forms of Yugoslavia's aid to underdeveloped countries are credit
agreements and treaties providing for scientific and technical cooperation. It is
estimated that Yugoslavia has extended commercial credits to, and concluded mutual
cooperation agreements with, thirty less developed nations. Approximately 1,3oo
Yugoslav scientists, technicians, and qualified workers are employed in various under-
developed areas of the world, while 5o0 students from those states study at Yugoslav
universities and scientific institutions79 The most active Yugoslav corporation in the
field of scientific and technical assistance to foreign countries is I.N.G.RA. in
Zagreb, which maintains twenty-one branch offices abroad and participates in "2i9
technical projects0
70 Josip Broz Tito, in Ta ATTITUDE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNIsrS OF YUGOSLAVIA TO CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 26-27; also, JoIE SMOLE, YuGOSLAv VIEWS ON Co-
EXiSTENCE 30-56 (i96I).
7 Tito, supra note 76, at 40 and 84-85; SIDOSTEUmOPA 6-8 and 12.
" Granfil, Yugoslav Export of Capital Goods, 15 [Yugoslav] REV. INT'L AFFAIRS 16-i8 (April
1964).
7' SUDOSTEUEoPE 2o-28.
80 Id. at 24; see also Ve~ernji List, Zagreb, Dec. 30, 1963, p. 3, cols. 1-2.
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The total amount of the Yugoslav credits to less developed countries is given
variously as 300 or 330 million dollars.8' These credits have been extended on a
steadily increased yearly basis since 1957, and have attained seventy million dollars
per annum in 1963."2 The interest rate is usually three per cent, and the repayment
period is set between twelve to twenty-five years. Considerable part of all the
credits has been given for the purchase of the Yugoslav industrial equipment and
other products. It is believed that approximately twenty-five per cent of all the
credits have been utilized so far.
The table below shows that Yugoslavia has extended commercial credits to less
developed countries around the world in the total amount of 357.6 million dollars.
However, in this sum are also included the credits given to Brazil (65 million
dollars) and to Argentina (45 million dollars), for ships to be built by the Yugoslav
shipyards 3
TABLE 284
YuGoszLAvIA's ECONOMIC CREDITS To LEss DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1957-1964
(Million U.S. dollars)
Area and Country Total Economic Credits and Grants
Total
Asia 89
India ...................................... 40
Indonesia .................................. 10
Cambodia ................................. 6
Ceylon .................................... 15
Pakistan ................................... 10
Afghanistan ................................ 8
Arab Countries and Middle East 47
Yemen .................................... 2
Egypt ..................................... 10
Sudan ..................................... 15
Tunisia .................................... 5
M orocco ................................... 5
Algeria .................................... 10
Africa 47
Ethiopia......................................... 10
Ghana .................................... 10
Guinea .................................... 7
M ali ...................................... 10
Tanganyka ................................ 10
Latin America 174.6
Argentina .................................. 45
Brazil ..................................... 122
Chile ...................................... 0.6
Bolivia .................................... 5
Uruguay ................................... 2
Grand Total 857.6
'x Granfil, supra note 78, at 17; Tim ATTITUDE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA TO
CUR'RENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 41.
"
2 GEORGE W. HOFFMANN & FRED WARNER NEAL, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE Naw COMMUNISM 356 (1962);
Privredni Pregled, BeIgrad, Sept. 13, 1959; THE ATrITUDE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, Op. cit. supra
note 34, at 4r.
" SijDOSTEUXOFA 65-67. It is questionable whether this type of credit could be called economic aid
to underdevloped countries.
"'This table is compiled on the basis of information given in SiJDosrEUROFA 28-73; 6 JUGOSLOVEN$S1
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The participation of Yugoslavia in the communist economic offensive in the
underdeveloped areas of the world is considerable. Computed on per capita basis,
Yugoslavia's contributions are only twenty per cent lower than those of the Soviet
Union, equal to the amount offered by other European socialist countries-some of
which are much more industrialized than Yugoslavia-and fifteen times larger than
the foreign aid given by Communist China." It is understandable, therefore, that
from the political point of view, this "independent foreign aid" offered by Yugo-
slavia has greatly enhanced her prestige among many underdeveloped nations which
commence to believe that the so-called neutral and non-committed position in the
world affairs is not so bad after all.
VI
EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
Although the total figure of foreign aid of all Socialist countries combined, during
the last decade, was less than ten per cent of the foreign aid extended by the United
States alone during the same period,"' the economic offensive of the communist world
in less developed areas and its effects on the global international situation should not
be underestimated.
The first thing to be recognized is the adaptability of the Soviet and other com-
munist leaders to the present political and economic realities. Instead of the rigid
dogmatism practiced by Stalin, new and more flexible methods for the promotion of
communist goals have been adopted. The second stage in the development of the
former colonial countries-the socialist revolution-is, in the opinion of the present
communist leaders, to be achieved by a slow economic and political penetration
rather than by the exclusive use of direct revolutionary means. This new interna-
tional economic policy, practiced under the slogan of active and peaceful coexistence,
by no means alters the ultimate goal of Marxism-Leninism which is the victory of
socialism under proletarian dictatorship. s7 However, because of its subtlety and
PREGLED 11-12 (1963); MIODRAG SUKIAyAOVId, PRAVNE KAXAxTERISTrIE DVOSTRANIH TRGoviNsxIm
UGovoRA PR jUGOSLAViyE [LEGAL CHARAcTERisTics oF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS OF THE FPR
YUGOSLAVIA] 122 ff. (Belgrad, 1959). It should be noted that not all of the agreements concerning
foreign economic or military aid have been reported. Some of them have remained undisclosed for
reasons of state security.
" The ratio of the population to the foreign economic assistance extended by the countries of the
communist orbit to underdeveloped nations is as follows:
Population Foreign aid in
in million million dollars
U.S.S.R. 220 4.400
European Satellites 95 1.200
Yugoslavia 18 300
People's China 700 825
s' For the foreign economic and military assistance of the United States in the period 1953-1963, see
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, pp. 858 fif.
"' Swearingen, Technique of Communist Aggression and the Moscow-Peking Axis, in NATIONALISM
AIM PROGRESS IN FREE AsIA 307-28 (1956); see also the Program of the CPSU, accepted at 22d Congress
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finesse it is often more dangerous for the free world than the overt revolutionary
actions. Briefly, this new economic trend makes the fight against communist ex-
pansion much more difficult and sometimes less effective.
The question arises, how successful have been, so far, the new methods of the
communist international offensive?
For searching for an answer to this question, the general disposition of the indi-
vidual leaders in the former colonial countries should be considered to be of prime
importance. In the underdeveloped countries where the political leadership is already
inclined to regard Lenin's socialism with sympathy, as in Ghana, Guinea, Algeria,
and Zanzibar, the communist economic offensive is undoubtedly very effective. It
helps the leaders of these states to demonstrate to their peoples that the future of their
nations lies in close cooperation with the Communist Bloc and in the eventual in-
troduction of socialism under a single party system.
In the countries with genuine democratic traditions, such as India, Tunisia,
Argentina, or Brazil, the economic aid of the Communist Bloc, though a challenge
to the free world, is not a force which would, at this time, seriously endanger the ties
which these countries have with the West, or imperial their democratic traditions.
The Arab countries of the Middle East, notably Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, are in a
special situation. There is little doubt that in spite of the substantial economic and
military assistance which they have received from the communist camp, a deep
mistrust exists between the leaders of international communism and the representa-
tives of Arab nationalism which is the controlling ideology of that area...
Generally speaking, the economic offensive of the Communist Bloc in the under-
developed areas of the world, and especially among the newly created former colonial
states, is favored by the following factors:
(a) Many peoples of the underdeveloped countries and former colonial possessions
have never lived under a genuine democratic system and for this reason
are unable to grasp the true meaning and the brutal reality of the proletarian
dictatorship."9
(b) Some of the leaders in the underdeveloped states are impressed by the rapid
industrialization of the Soviet Union and its achievements under socialist
order. The fact that only sixty years ago the geographical area of the Soviet
Union was one of the underdeveloped parts of the world, incites them to
emulate the Soviet example by using socialist doctrine as a generating force
also in their own countries °
(c) Many leaders of these countries maintain a certain degree of grudge against
their former colonial rulers and the Western world in general. In this re-
spect, the Soviets, who claim that they have never been a colonial power,
in October x961, N.Y. Times, Aug. x, ig6x, pp. C 14-15, cols. 8 and 1-4; see also Tito, supra note 76, at
17-19.
88 See Khrushchev speech of January 27, 1959, in RUBINSTEIN 400-01.
89 See WLADYSLAW W. Kue-.ssc, PEACEFUL Co-ExISTENCE 240-51 (1959).9 0 HA Y ScswARz, THE SovIET UNION-COMMUNIsr EcoNoMic PowER 60-62 (1963).
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have certain advantages, not mentioning the Chinese who, in addition to their
former semi-colonial status, exploit very adroitly their brotherhood in color
and raceP'
The foreign economic drive of the Communist Bloc represents a challenge to the
free world and to its policy to secure freedom and peaceful progress in the under-
developed areas. This challenge must be met with determination and appropriate
counter moves. It cannot, of course, be expected that the American, or any other
type of Western political and economic system, can be propagated and imposed
through media of economic aid or military assistance. Nevertheless, it is mandatory
that the policy of the free world in those areas be directed towards one basic goal.
This goal is the preservation and implementation of fundamental human rights.
among which is the right of every man to express freely his mind and conviction
and to elect without restraint the political and economic system under which he wants
to live.
"1 Cooley, supra note 3; Fitzgerald, supra note 64. For a good evaluation of the Sino-Soviet competition
and rivalry in the underdeveloped nations, see Dienerstein, Rivary in Underdeveloped Areas, 13 PROBLEMS
OF COMMUNISm 64-72 (1964).
